The High Court Report

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 27, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026 Overview: Federal pesticide law blocks a Missouri cancer patient's failure-to-warn lawsuit against Monsanto after the EPA repeatedly approved Roundup's label without requiring a cancer warning, despite the patient's claims linking Roundup to his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Question Presented: Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act expressly preempts a state-law failure-to-warn claim seeking a cancer warning the EPA declined to require. Posture: Missouri jury awarded Durnell $1.25M; Court of Appeals affirmed; Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Main Arguments: • Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's registration and label approval without a cancer warning creates a binding federal requirement that preempts stricter state demands; (2) Riegel v. Medtronic establishes that analogous agency approval processes create preemptive federal requirements; (3) Missouri's failure-to-warn verdict retroactively penalizes Monsanto for complying with the federal label EPA mandated. • Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA's misbranding prohibition — not EPA's specific label approval — sets the operative federal labeling requirement, and Missouri's tort mirrors it exactly; (2) FIFRA § 136a(f)(2) bars treating registration as a complete defense, stripping EPA approval of conclusive force; (3) Manufacturers can add a cancer warning through amended registration or minor modification, defeating impossibility preemption. Holding: FIFRA's preemption clause, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), expressly preempts Durnell's state-law failure-to-warn claim because the claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to Roundup's label in addition to or different from the label required under FIFRA. Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch. Reversed and remanded. Majority Reasoning: • (1) FIFRA's registration process mandates substantive EPA label review; after approval, manufacturers must use that label and cannot change it without prior agency authorization; • (2) Riegel v. Medtronic establishes that analogous agency approval creates binding federal "requirements" — EPA pesticide registration functions identically and carries the same preemptive force; • (3) Durnell's claim imposes a labeling requirement "in addition to or different from" the EPA-approved label, triggering FIFRA's express preemption clause and its mandate for nationwide uniformity. Separate Opinions: • Justice Thomas (concurring): Joined the majority fully; wrote separately to flag three constitutional concerns: FIFRA may exceed Congress's Commerce Clause authority, violate the non-delegation doctrine, and rely on a form of agency preemption the Supremacy Clause may not support. • Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Gorsuch): FIFRA's misbranding prohibition — not EPA's label approval — constitutes the operative federal requirement. Missouri's failure-to-warn tort mirrors that prohibition, imposing nothing "in addition to or different from" federal law; § 136a(f)(2) confirms registration carries no preemptive force. Implications: • (1) State-law failure-to-warn claims against federally registered pesticides face preemption nationwide, closing state courtrooms to injured consumers seeking damages; • (2) Plaintiffs must petition the EPA directly, then seek judicial review of agency decisions, rather than pursue state tort remedies — a longer, harder road with no individual damages award; • (3) Manufacturers across food, drug, medical device, and consumer product industries gain stronger preemption defenses under analogous federal labeling statutes. The Fine Print: • FIFRA § 136v(b) — "Uniformity": "A State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter." • FIFRA § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter. Such registration shall, however, be accepted as prima facie evidence that the pesticide, its labeling and packaging comply with the registration provisions of this subchapter." Primary Cases: • Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn tort claims qualify as labeling "requirements" under FIFRA's preemption clause; courts must assess whether those requirements exceed or differ from FIFRA's own mandates. • Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008): FDA premarket approval of a medical device creates binding federal "requirements" under a nearly identical preemption clause, preempting state tort claims seeking additional or different safety measures. Oral Advocates: Petitioner (Monsanto): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy Respondent (Durnell): Ashley C. Keller of Keller Postman Amicus Curiae (United States): Sarah M. Harris of the Department of Justice

Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. v. Doe, et al. | No. 25-1083 (consolidated with Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. Miot, et al., No. 25-1084) | Docket: Here | Argued: April 29, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026 Overview: The TPS statute strips federal courts of all power to review the Secretary of Homeland Security's mandatory procedures when terminating Temporary Protected Status, cutting off legal relief for hundreds of thousands of immigrants from thirteen countries. Question Presented: Whether the TPS statute's judicial review bar blocks all court challenges — including claims the Secretary violated mandatory statutory procedures — when terminating TPS designations for Syria and Haiti. Posture: District courts granted emergency relief; appellate courts declined stays; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment. Main Arguments: • Government (Petitioner): (1) "Determination" in § 1254a(b)(5)(A) covers every step in the TPS termination process — both the final decision and all procedures leading to it — barring all non-constitutional challenges; (2) the Secretary satisfied the consultation requirement by seeking State Department input before each termination; (3) terminating all thirteen TPS countries across racially diverse nations defeats any inference of racial animus against Haiti. • TPS Holders (Respondent): (1) "Determination" covers only the Secretary's factual conclusion about country conditions, not the mandatory procedural steps Congress wrote specifically to constrain executive discretion; (2) the Secretary never consulted agencies about country conditions — the State Department email addressed "foreign policy concerns," not safety; (3) presidential statements about Haitians combined with the across-the-board termination pattern demonstrate racial animus as a motivating factor. Holding: The TPS statute's judicial review bar blocks all non-constitutional challenges to TPS termination decisions, including claims the Secretary failed to follow mandatory procedural requirements; the Haitian TPS holders failed to demonstrate racial animus likely motivated Haiti's termination, making preliminary relief unavailable on their equal protection claim; both District Court orders reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion (all parts except Part III-A) joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett; Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh also joined Part III-A, making that section a four-Justice plurality only. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded. Majority Reasoning: • (1) "Determination" — under any ordinary meaning, individual decision or entire process leading to one — covers all non-constitutional TPS challenges, including procedural claims; (2) "with respect to" further broadens the bar to cover everything relating to the termination, citing Patel v. Garland (2022); (3) respondents' own argument that the Secretary terminated all thirteen racially diverse TPS countries supplies the race-neutral explanation defeating the equal protection claim. Separate Opinions: • Justice Thomas (Concurring): Joined the majority in full; argued the judicial review bar also eliminates constitutional claims; further argued that aliens hold no equal protection rights against the federal government because Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) was wrongly decided. (35 words) • Justice Kagan (Dissenting, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson): Argued "determination" refers only to the Secretary's country-conditions conclusions, not mandatory procedural steps preceding them; the State Department email exchange never constituted real consultation; and racial animus tainted Haiti's termination under Arlington Heights . (37 words) Implications: • (1) Federal courts lose all power to enforce TPS mandatory procedures, leaving statutory compliance to political oversight alone; (2) employers of TPS workers from thirteen countries lose the litigation buffer that previously paused terminations; (3) Justice Thomas's concurrence targeting constitutional review creates significant uncertainty for future constitutional challenges to TPS decisions. The Fine Print: • 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) (TPS Judicial Review Bar): "There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state [under this subsection]." • 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A) (Mandatory Consultation Requirement): "[A]t least 60 days before [the] end [of the initial period of designation]... the [Secretary], after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government, shall review the conditions in the foreign state... and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation under this subsection continue to be met." Primary Cases: • Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977): Government violates equal protection when racial discrimination forms "a motivating factor" in a decision — not the only factor or dominant factor, but any factor among many. • Patel v. Garland (2022): The phrase "with respect to" in a judicial review bar "generally has a broadening effect," ensuring the bar covers not just the core subject but also matters relating to that subject. Oral Advocates: Petitioners (United States): D. John Sauer, United States’ Solicitor General Respondents (Doe): Ahilan T. Arulanantham of UCLA School of Law Respondents (Miot): Geoffrey M. Pipoly of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP

OVERVIEW Three opinions released June 30th, 2026 — the final day of the October 2025 Term — spanning birthright citizenship, transgender athletes in school sports, and political party campaign spending. Two decisions split 6-3 along identical lines — the same conservative majority, anchored by Kavanaugh — in West Virginia v. B.P.J. (Title IX and equal protection) and NRSC v. FEC (First Amendment). A third split 5-4 in Trump v. Barbara, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett crossing coalitions to strike down the President's birthright citizenship order alongside the Court's three liberal justices. Justice Kavanaugh authored two majorities and a pivotal concurrence-in-judgment-and-dissent-in-part in the third — the day's most prolific author. Justice Gorsuch filed three separate writings across two cases — two dissents in Barbara (one joining Thomas, one solo) plus a concurrence in B.P.J. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in Barbara and a concurrence in B.P.J. The liberal bloc — Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson — voted together in all three cases, splitting only in B.P.J. where Sotomayor and Jackson each filed separate partial dissents. Trump v. Barbara spans 194 pages — 30 more than another blockbuster this Term, the Trump Tariff Cases. Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Argued: 04/01/2026 | Decided: 06/30/2026 Overview: President Trump's executive order strips birthright citizenship from children of unlawfully or temporarily present parents, triggering a constitutional fight over the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause. Question Presented: Whether the Citizenship Clause guarantees citizenship to children born here to unlawfully or temporarily present parents. Posture: District Court enjoined the order; Supreme Court granted cert before judgment. Holding: Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present still fall "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States and thus qualify as citizens at birth under the Citizenship Clause. Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, joined by Sotomayor as to the introduction and Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Gorsuch. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a separate dissenting opinion. Affirmed. Majority Reasoning: (1) English common law granted citizenship by birth regardless of parents' momentary presence; (2) The Fourteenth Amendment and Wong Kim Ark (1898) codify that rule, rejecting Dred Scott; (3) Historical record shows scant evidence Congress intended a domicile requirement. Separate Opinions: Justice Jackson (concurring): Rebuts Thomas's narrower reading, framing the Amendment as a broad anticaste reset rather than a remedy solely for formerly enslaved people. Justice Kavanaugh (concurring in judgment, dissenting in part): Order violates a federal statute, not the Constitution; Congress could legislate new exceptions but hasn't. Justice Thomas (dissenting): Citizenship requires actual domicile, not mere birth; Amendment protected only those with "no other homeland." Justice Alito (dissenting): Citizenship requires sole allegiance; majority's rule extends citizenship to children of "birth tourists." Justice Gorsuch (dissenting): Advances a distinct "settler's view" tying citizenship to parents making America their permanent home. Implications: (1) Executive orders alone cannot narrow birthright citizenship nationwide; (2) Congress gains a roadmap, via Kavanaugh's statutory theory, to legislate new exceptions; (3) Families with undocumented or temporary-status parents retain citizenship certainty for now. The Fine Print: Fourteenth Amendment, Citizenship Clause: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." 8 U.S.C. §1401(a): Persons "born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" qualify as "nationals and citizens of the United States at birth." Primary Cases: United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): Confirms the Fourteenth Amendment extends birthright citizenship broadly, with only narrow exceptions for diplomats and similar categories. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): Denied citizenship based on ancestry; the Fourteenth Amendment overturns this ruling entirely. West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 (consolidated with Little v. Hecox, No. 24-38) | Argued: 01/13/2026 | Decided: 06/30/2026 Overview: West Virginia and Idaho ban transgender girls from girls' school sports, prompting a Title IX and Equal Protection Clause challenge from two transgender athletes. Question Presented: Whether Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause permit schools to limit girls' sports teams to biological females. Posture: Fourth Circuit partially reversed; Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction against Idaho's law. Holding: Schools may limit girls' and women's sports teams to biological females under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause without violating federal law or the Constitution. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kagan and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Reversed and remanded. Majority Reasoning: (1) Title IX's own regulations expressly permit separate-sex teams, so separation doesn't constitute prohibited discrimination; (2) Safety and competitive fairness qualify as important interests satisfying intermediate scrutiny; (3) States need not conduct individualized athlete-by-athlete physical assessments. Separate Opinions: Justice Thomas (concurring): Argues transgender status doesn't qualify as a suspect class warranting heightened constitutional scrutiny. Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Title IX never "clearly and unambiguously" warned schools that single-sex teams violate funding conditions. Justice Sotomayor (dissenting in part): Majority resolves an unsettled factual dispute over athletic advantage prematurely, before required fact-finding completes. Justice Jackson (dissenting in part): Majority needlessly narrows Title IX's definition of "sex," risking broader transgender-student protections. Implications: (1) States gain constitutional cover for laws restricting girls' sports to biological females; (2) Transgender athletes lose their strongest federal legal argument for inclusion; (3) Voluntary inclusion policies and male/co-ed team questions remain unresolved. The Fine Print: Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a): "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in...any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 34 CFR §106.41(b): Schools may "sponsor separate teams for members of each sex" based on competitive skill or contact-sport status. Primary Cases: United States v. Virginia (1996): Physical differences between men and women qualify as "enduring," justifying sex-based athletic classifications under intermediate scrutiny. Bostock v. Clayton County (2020): Firing someone for being transgender violates Title VII, but the ruling doesn't address single-sex facilities or sports teams. National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC | Case No. 24-621 | Argued: 12/09/2025 | Decided: 06/30/2026 Overview: Political committees challenge federal limits on party spending coordinated directly with candidates, asking the Court to overrule its own 2001 precedent upholding those caps. Question Presented: Whether FECA's limits on political-party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment. Posture: En banc Sixth Circuit upheld the limits, following Colorado II as binding precedent. Holding: FECA's limits on political parties' coordinated expenditures with candidates violate the First Amendment, and Colorado II no longer retains vitality. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded. Majority Reasoning: (1) Coordination between parties and candidates forms the essence of the party system, with no documented historical corruption; (2) Modern precedent demands narrower tailoring than Colorado II applied; (3) Earmarking and disclosure rules already guard against circumvention concerns. Separate Opinions: Justice Kagan (dissenting): Coordinated spending lets donors circumvent base contribution limits entirely, recreating quid pro quo corruption risks Congress...

Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. v. Al Otro Lado, et al. | Case No. 25-5 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-5.html | Argued: March 24, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026 Overview: Border-access challenge determining whether federal immigration law requires officers to inspect and process asylum seekers at ports of entry before they cross into U.S. territory, or whether statutory duties attach only upon physical territorial entry. Question Presented: Whether noncitizens blocked at the border before physically crossing "arrive in the United States," triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing duties under federal immigration law. Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; district court declared metering policy unlawful; Supreme Court reversed. Main Arguments: Government (Petitioner): (1) "Arrives in" carries its ordinary meaning — physical territorial entry; a running back stopped at the 1-yard line has not arrived in the end zone; (2) INA inspection and removal procedures presuppose U.S. presence — officers cannot enforce them against people standing in Mexico; (3) Sale v. Haitian Centers Council and the presumption against extraterritoriality confirm statutory duties apply only inside U.S. territory. Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in" covers noncitizens in the process of arriving at ports — otherwise the clause wholly duplicates "physically present," violating the surplusage canon; (2) Congress enacted §§1158 and 1225 to implement non-refoulement obligations barring return of refugees to persecution; (3) Federal regulations for 30 years defined "arriving alien" as anyone "attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry." Holding: An alien standing in Mexico does not "arrive in the United States" by attempting and failing to cross the border. The INA neither entitles such an alien to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect them. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a separate dissenting opinion. Reversed and remanded. 138 F.4th 1102, reversed and remanded. Majority Reasoning: (1) "Arrives in" carries its ordinary meaning — entering within the limits of a place — not merely approaching its threshold; dictionary definitions and everyday analogies confirm physical entry controls; (2) Other INA provisions expressly cover those who "attempt to enter," but §§1158 and 1225 omit attempt language — Congress acted deliberately; (3) Presumption against extraterritoriality bars reading these statutes to reach people standing on Mexican soil. Separate Opinions: Justice Thomas — Concurring: Joined majority fully. Wrote separately to flag two future issues: §1252(f)(1) may bar class-wide declaratory relief in immigration cases; and compelling the President to admit specific aliens would raise serious constitutional questions about inherent executive exclusion authority. Justice Sotomayor — Dissenting (joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson): "Arrives in" covers noncitizens in the process of arriving at ports; federal regulations, the anti-surplusage canon, and the present-tense statutory language all demand inspection duties attach before physical crossing. Majority's ruling will cost lives. Justice Jackson — Dissenting: DHS rescinded metering in 2021 with no concrete reinstatement plans; the case approached mootness and the Court effectively issued an advisory opinion in a factual vacuum. Also joined Sotomayor dissent on the merits. Implications: (1) Government can resume metering; asylum and inspection duties attach only after a noncitizen physically crosses the border; (2) Future APA challenges to specific metering policies — applied as subterfuge when ports retain capacity — remain live; (3) Thomas's concurrence signals future challenges to class-wide immigration court orders and expanded presidential exclusion authority. The Fine Print: 8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(1): "An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival...) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission." 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(1): "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival...), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title." Primary Cases: Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993): Article 33 of the Refugee Convention cannot restrict U.S. actions toward aliens outside U.S. territory; statutory refugee protections apply only within the United States. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. (2010): Courts presume federal statutes apply domestically unless Congress affirmatively and unmistakably directs extraterritorial reach. Oral Advocates: Petitioners (Noem, et al.): Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice Respondents (Al Otro Lado): Kelsi B. Corkran of the the of Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protectio

OVERVIEW Four opinions released June 29th, 2026 — one day, across digital privacy, presidential removal power at two federal agencies, and absentee ballot receipt deadlines. Two decisions split 6-3 along identical lines — the same conservative majority, the same liberal dissent — in Chatrie (Fourth Amendment) and Slaughter (FTC removal). A third split 5-4 in Cook , with Roberts crossing coalitions to block the President's removal of a Federal Reserve governor. A fourth, Watson , drew Barrett alongside Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson to protect state absentee-ballot rules. Chief Justice Roberts authored two majorities — opposite outcomes in two "Trump v." cases on the same day. Justice Alito dissented three times, authoring a majority only in Slaughter . Justice Gorsuch filed concurrences in two cases — challenging Katz in Chatrie , warning of executive power consolidation in Slaughter . The liberal bloc — Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson — voted together in all four. The Court plans to release opinions tomorrow, June 30th — likely the final batch of the October 2025 Term.

Wolford v. Lopez | Case No. 24-1046 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: January 20, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026 Overview: After Bruen recognized the right to public carry, Hawaii required licensed gun carriers to obtain express permission before entering any private business open to the public — reversing the common-law presumption of open entry for anyone, including armed citizens. Question Presented: Whether Hawaii may prohibit licensed carry permit holders from entering private commercial property while armed without the property owner's express permission. Posture: District court enjoined the law; Ninth Circuit reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari. Main Arguments: Petitioner (Carry Permit Holders): (1) Hawaii's law burdens the daily exercise of Second Amendment rights by effectively banning carry on ninety-six percent of publicly accessible land; (2) No historical tradition justifies flipping the common-law default from implied permission to presumptive prohibition on property open to the public; (3) Hawaii's anti-poaching analogues targeted agricultural land and distinct hunting harms — not concealed carry in commercial establishments. Respondent (Hawaii): (1) The Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without consent — the form of that consent belongs to state property law; (2) Colonial anti-poaching laws and Reconstruction-era statutes support a tradition of requiring affirmative consent for armed carry onto private property; (3) Hawaii's law vindicates property owners' right to exclude by requiring armed visitors to seek express permission before entry. Holding: Hawaii's law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner's express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Part II–B only. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Reversed and remanded. Majority Reasoning: (1) Hawaii's law falls within the Second Amendment's plain text — permit holders sought to "bear" "Arms" in public, making the law presumptively unconstitutional; (2) Hawaii's colonial anti-poaching analogues targeted agricultural land and hunting-specific harms vastly different from restricting concealed carry in commercial establishments; (3) Hawaii's 1865 Louisiana Black Code analogue — enacted to disarm newly freed Black Americans — carries no probative value under the Bruen framework. Separate Opinions: Barrett (concurring; Thomas and Gorsuch join as to Part II–B only): Property-law framing doesn't immunize Hawaii's law from Second Amendment scrutiny. States may not use property rules to evade constitutional limits. Anti-poaching laws and Black Codes both fail Bruen's "why" inquiry. Thomas and Gorsuch joined only the Black Code portion. Kagan (dissenting): Anti-poaching laws share sufficient "how" and "why" with Hawaii's rule — both required express consent for armed entry onto private property in response to harms posed by armed individuals on another's land. Kagan dissented solely on the historical analogue question. Jackson (dissenting; Sotomayor joins): This case never implicated the Second Amendment — the dispute concerns only the form of consent required for armed entry onto private property, a question state property law controls. Hawaii's historical analogues satisfy Bruen. The majority invites unconstrained judicial discretion. Implications: (1) Carry permit holders may now enter commercial property in Hawaii, California, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York absent an owner's posted prohibition; (2) Business owners now bear the burden of posting signage to exclude armed visitors; (3) Courts must apply a stricter historical analogue standard to Second Amendment challenges. The Fine Print: Second Amendment, U.S. Const. Amdt. 2: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-9.5(a) (2023): "A [licensed] person carrying a firearm [may not] intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly enter or remain on private property of another person while carrying a loaded or unloaded firearm, whether the firearm is operable or not, and whether the firearm is concealed or unconcealed, unless the person has been given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property." Primary Cases: New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Established the two-step framework for Second Amendment challenges — requiring States to justify gun regulations through history and tradition, rejecting interest-balancing tests. District of Columbia v. Heller (2008): Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, with self-defense as the core purpose; history governs the right's scope. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner (Wolford): Alan A. Beck, San Diego, California. For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues. For Respondent (Lopez): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.

Blanche, Acting Attorney General v. Muk Choi Lau | Case No. 25-429 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 22, 2026 | Decided: June 23, 2026 Overview: The Court addressed whether border officers must possess clear and convincing evidence that a green card holder committed a crime before stripping that person of already-admitted status and treating the holder as an applicant for admission. Question Presented: Whether the INA requires border officers to possess clear and convincing evidence of a crime before treating a green card holder as seeking admission. Posture: Second Circuit vacated removal order; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split. Main Arguments: • Petitioner (Government): (1) The INA imposes no evidentiary burden on border officers making on-the-spot classification decisions; (2) the two-step framework requires crime commission at step one and conviction at step two, both satisfied here; (3) the government met the clear-and-convincing standard at the removal hearing through Lau's guilty plea. • Respondent (Lau): (1) The INA's "shall not" command required the government to determine whether an exception applied before treating a returning green card holder as seeking admission; (2) the statute's present-perfect tense confirms border officers must make that determination at the moment of reentry, not later; (3) a conviction entered after the parole decision cannot retroactively justify the border officer's classification call. Holding: The INA does not require a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating the resident as an applicant for admission. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. Second Circuit judgment vacated and remanded. Majority Reasoning: (1) Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) requires only crime commission — not conviction — at step one to trigger "seeking admission" status; conviction or admission of guilt at step two establishes inadmissibility; (2) the INA nowhere imposes a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on border officers making on-the-spot classification calls; (3) the BIA's clear-and-convincing standard applies at removal hearings — not at the border — and the government satisfied it through Lau's guilty plea. Separate Opinions: • Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan): The INA's "shall not" command required the government to determine whether an exception applied before reclassifying a returning green card holder as seeking admission. The majority permits post hoc justification, gutting the statutory protection Congress built for green card holders. Implications: (1) Green card holders face possible parole at any border crossing if a pending criminal charge appears in federal databases — no evidentiary floor required at the moment of the call; (2) courts must still resolve what standard — if any — governs border officers' parole decisions; (3) the Second Circuit must decide on remand whether Lau's conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. The Fine Print: 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v): "An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien . . . has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title" 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I): "convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude" Primary Cases: Barton v. Barr (2020): Established the two-step framework for removing returning lawful permanent residents — crime commission at step one triggers "seeking admission" status; conviction at step two establishes inadmissibility. Matter of Valenzuela-Felix (BIA 2012): The Board of Immigration Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to removal hearings only, not the border — the distinction the majority adopted and the Second Circuit ignored. Oral Advocates: Petitioner (United States): Sopan Joshi of the Department of Justice Respondent (Muk Choi Lau): Shay Dvoretzky of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

Pung v. Isabella County | Case No. 25-95 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 02/25/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026 Overview: A Michigan family lost their $194,400 home at a tax auction for $76,008 over a disputed $2,241.93 debt. The Court decided whether just compensation under the Takings Clause demands fair market value or only the auction surplus. Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause requires the government to pay fair market value — not just the auction surplus — after a tax foreclosure sale. Posture: District Court awarded surplus only; Sixth Circuit affirmed on circuit precedent; Supreme Court granted certiorari. Main Arguments: Petitioner (Pung Family): (1) Just compensation under the Fifth Amendment requires fair market value, not the artificially depressed auction sale price; (2) No court in 250 years held surplus proceeds automatically satisfy just compensation for a home sold far below assessed value; (3) The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause bars the government from consuming the vast majority of a homeowner's equity over a small tax debt. Respondent (Isabella County): (1) Centuries of English and American law establish that surplus auction proceeds satisfy just compensation in tax foreclosure sales; (2) Adopting fair market value as the constitutional baseline would render tax foreclosure sales financially infeasible for governments nationwide; (3) The Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to fairly conducted tax sales with deep historical roots. Holding: The proper baseline for just compensation after a tax foreclosure sale is the auction price — the surplus above the tax debt — not the property's hypothetical fair market value, at least when the sale proceeds fairly in light of the nation's history of tax sales. The Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does not require more than the surplus proceeds. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson; Justice Thomas joined except as to Part II-B. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Gorsuch and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Gorsuch except as to footnote 1. Vacated and remanded. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) Centuries of English and American law — codified in founding-era statutes and confirmed in Court precedent — established surplus auction proceeds as the measure of just compensation in tax foreclosure sales; (2) Owners can generally avoid tax foreclosure by refinancing or selling voluntarily, distinguishing tax sales from traditional eminent domain; (3) A fair-market-value rule would render tax sales financially infeasible, forcing governments to pay delinquent taxpayers more than the auction ever generates. Separate Opinions: Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Gorsuch and Jackson): Agreed with the result but wrote separately to clarify that the majority's "fairly conducted" language does not define the constitutional floor for a valid tax auction — leaving that standard open for the lower courts on remand. Justice Thomas (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Gorsuch except footnote 1): Declined to join Part II-B; argued historical tax-sale tradition imposed strict limits the County violated — including exhausting personal property before seizing the home and selling only as much as necessary — and called the County's conduct likely unconstitutional. Implications: (1) Homeowners facing tax foreclosure cannot demand fair market value as a constitutional right — only the auction surplus; (2) Governments may conduct tax sales without paying more than the surplus, preserving the system nationwide as a viable debt-collection tool; (3) Lower courts must now define what a "fairly conducted" auction requires, inviting future constitutional challenges on procedural grounds. The Fine Print: Fifth Amendment, Takings Clause: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation" Eighth Amendment, Excessive Fines Clause: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" Primary Cases: Tyler v. Hennepin County (2023): The government must return surplus proceeds from a tax foreclosure sale to the former owner; retaining the surplus violates the Takings Clause. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1994): A foreclosure sale price reflects the actual market for foreclosed property; the former owner does not recover fair market value through foreclosure. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner (Pung): Philip L. Ellison of Outside Legal Counsel PLC. United States as Amicus Curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice. For Respondent (Isabella County, Michigan): Matthew Nelson of Warner Norcross and Judd.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. | Case No. 24-699 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 02/23/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026 Overview: Cuba's Communist government confiscated Exxon's oil refinery and service stations in 1960. Congress created a legal remedy in 1996 via the Helms-Burton Act. The Court decided whether that law itself strips Cuban government companies of their immunity shield. Question Presented: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban government agencies and instrumentalities, excusing plaintiffs from satisfying the FSIA's separate exceptions. Posture: District court and divided D.C. Circuit sided with Cuban defendants; Supreme Court granted cert. Main Arguments: Petitioner (Exxon Mobil): (1) Helms-Burton's express cause of action against foreign instrumentalities abrogates sovereign immunity under Court precedent without a separate waiver provision; (2) Applying the FSIA guts the cause of action because the simultaneous embargo bars the commercial nexus those exceptions require; (3) The Act routes suits through §1331 — not §1330 — and grants the President exclusive gatekeeping power, confirming FSIA displacement. Respondents (CIMEX/CUPET): (1) Helms-Burton's text never addresses sovereign immunity, failing the unmistakably-clear abrogation standard; (2) Congress considered adding an express FSIA exception and deliberately dropped it after DOJ objected; (3) The FSIA and Helms-Burton can coexist because some suits satisfy FSIA exceptions through lawful Cuba-U.S. commercial activity. Holding: The Helms-Burton Act abrogates the foreign sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs who sue Cuban agencies or instrumentalities under the Act need not separately satisfy an FSIA exception. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) The Act's cause of action expressly applies against foreign instrumentalities, which under Kirtz (2024) abrogates immunity without a separate waiver provision; (2) Applying the FSIA guts the cause of action — the simultaneous Cuba embargo bars the commercial nexus the FSIA's exceptions require, creating an inescapable trap Congress never intended; (3) The Act routes suits through §1331 not §1330, grants the President exclusive immunity-gatekeeping authority mirroring the pre-FSIA regime, and expressly contemplates judgments against Cuban entities — all confirming FSIA displacement. Separate Opinions: Justice Kagan — Dissenting (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson): Helms-Burton's text never addresses immunity; Congress dropped a draft FSIA amendment after DOJ objection; the cause of action retains meaningful work against private defendants without any abrogation. Implications: (1) American claimants with Cuba-confiscated property can now sue Cuban government entities under Helms-Burton, bypassing FSIA exceptions entirely; (2) Dozens of pending suits involving Cuban hotels, ports, and airports advance to the merits; (3) The Court reserved whether the ruling extends to non-Cuban foreign instrumentalities, guaranteeing future litigation. The Fine Print: 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A) (Helms-Burton Act / Title III): "any person that...traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property" 28 U.S.C. §1604 (FSIA): "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter" Primary Cases: Dep't of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Congressional creation of a cause of action expressly applying against government agencies or instrumentalities abrogates sovereign immunity without a separate waiver provision. Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo (2023): Congress does not "authorize a suit against a sovereign with one hand, only to bar it with the other" — statutory schemes must afford meaningful remedies to identified defendants. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner (Exxon Mobil): Morgan Ratner of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP argues for Petitioner Exxon Mobil. United States as Amicus Curiae: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice. For Respondents (Corporación Cimex): Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Overview: Four opinions released June 25th, 2026 — one day, across environmental tort preemption, immigration enforcement, executive authority over humanitarian protections, and Second Amendment rights. Three of four decisions split 6–3: identical conservative majority, identical liberal dissent, three consecutive times. The fourth — a Roundup cancer lawsuit and a $1 million-plus Missouri jury verdict — fractured the usual alliances, drawing Sotomayor and Kagan into a 7–2 conservative coalition while pushing Gorsuch into dissent alongside Jackson. Justice Alito authored three majority opinions; Justice Kavanaugh authored one; Chief Justice Roberts joined all four without writing separately. Justice Thomas wrote or joined a separate concurrence in all four cases — each one planting seeds for future constitutional challenges to the administrative state, executive immigration power, and federal equal protection doctrine. Justice Jackson dissented in all four cases — twice as the author — making her the most prolific dissenter of the opinion day. This episode breaks down all four decisions: authors, vote splits, key holdings, Thomas's concurrence roadmap, and real-world consequences. Monsanto Co. versus Durnell | No. 24–1068 Federal preemption law (FIFRA) blocks state failure-to-warn tort claims requiring cancer warnings on Roundup's label beyond what the EPA approved. 7–2. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion flagging three structural concerns: FIFRA likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority; EPA's labeling power raises non-delegation problems; and agency regulations may lack Supremacy Clause status to preempt state law. Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Gorsuch. Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. versus Al Otro Lado et al. | No. 25–5 An alien standing in Mexico does not "arrive in the United States" within the meaning of the INA; inspection and asylum obligations don't attach before physical border crossing. 6–3. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing lower courts evaded §1252(f)(1)'s classwide injunction bar through declaratory-relief labeling, and that statutes compelling the President to admit aliens would infringe inherent executive exclusion authority. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Kagan and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a separate dissenting opinion. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. versus Doe et al. | Nos. 25–1083 & 25–1084 The TPS statute bars judicial review of termination decisions; the equal protection race claim challenging Haiti's TPS termination unlikely to succeed on the merits. Justice Alito announced the judgment and delivered the Court's opinion, joined in full by Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh, and except for Part III–A by Gorsuch and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars even constitutional claims, that Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) deserves overruling, and that non-citizen immigrants hold no constitutional equal protection rights against federal immigration decisions. Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. Second and D.C. Circuits reversed and remanded. Wolford et al. versus Lopez, Attorney General of Hawaii | No. 24–1046 Hawaii's law prohibiting licensed carry-permit holders from carrying firearms on private property open to the public without the owner's express consent violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. 6–3. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion — joined by Thomas and Gorsuch as to Part II–B — rejecting Hawaii's property-law framing and disqualifying both the anti-poaching and Black Code historical analogues as invalid historical support under Bruen. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Sotomayor. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

PART 1: SHOW NOTES Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-856.html | Argued: 04/28/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026 Overview: The Supreme Court ended corporate accountability under two federal human-rights statutes, ruling that courts carry no authority to create new Alien Tort Statute lawsuits and that the Torture Victim Protection Act reaches only direct perpetrators — not their corporate enablers. Question Presented: Whether the ATS and TVPA authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company that allegedly helped a foreign government torture a religious minority. Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026. Main Arguments: Cisco (Petitioner): (1) Post- Sosa and Egbert precedents stripped courts of authority to create any new ATS cause of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress; (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory text; (3) TVPA's "subjects" covers command responsibility only — not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or physical control of victims. Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondents): (1) Aiding-and-abetting violations of the law of nations itself violated international law at the Founding — the First Congress built that liability into the ATS; (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both statutes support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis; (3) Congress chose the broad verb "subjects" over the narrower "commits" to reach secondary actors — legislative history confirms it. Holding: Federal courts carry no authority to create new causes of action under the ATS, and the TVPA's "subjects" language does not reach those who aided and abetted torture. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) Post- Sosa precedents — especially Egbert v. Boule (2022) — establish that creating causes of action belongs exclusively to Congress, eliminating courts' residual ATS common-law authority Sosa described as "slight"; (2) Central Bank of Denver forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express congressional text, and neither the ATS nor the TVPA supplies it; (3) ATS cases categorically raise foreign policy and separation-of-powers concerns that always counsel deference to Congress — no judicial cause of action survives that constraint. Separate Opinions: Justice Jackson (concurring in judgment in part / dissenting in part, joined by Kagan): Agreed TVPA's "subjects" excludes aiding-and-abetting but rejected the majority's deployment of Central Bank as a magic-words test; dissented from the ATS holding alongside Justice Sotomayor. Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V): Accused the majority of covertly overruling Sosa without stare decisis analysis; argued "subjects" covers corporate complicity in torture; flagged the logical contradiction of preserving the Blackstone three while eliminating all other ATS implied claims. Implications: (1) American companies now face near-zero civil exposure in U.S. courts for knowingly helping foreign governments commit human rights abuses; (2) Torture and atrocity victims must pursue accountability through Congress or the political branches — federal courts stepped out; (3) Congress must enact express aiding-and-abetting liability before courts reenter this territory. The Fine Print: Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual." Primary Cases: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain "narrow" authority to recognize new ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step specificity test — authority the majority now declares nonexistent. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability under a federal statute requires Congress to expressly provide for it; statutory silence implies nothing. Oral Advocates: Petitioners (Cisco Systems): Kannon K. Shanmugam of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP Respondents (Doe I, et al.): Paul L. Hoffman of Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLP Amicus Curiae (United States): Curtis E. Gannon of the Department of Justice

Overview: Five opinions released June 23rd, 2026 — one day, across immigration, international human rights, foreign sovereign immunity, religious freedom, and property rights. Four of five decisions split 6–3: identical conservative majority, identical liberal dissent, four consecutive times. The fifth — a Michigan family's $2,241 tax bill and a home sold at auction for $76,008 — drew near-unanimous agreement across ideological lines. Every conservative Justice authored a majority; Chief Justice Roberts joined all five without writing one. Justice Jackson led all Justices in separate opinion output — three opinions across the five cases. This episode breaks down all five decisions: authors, vote splits, key holdings, separate opinions, and real-world consequences. Blanche, Acting Attorney General versus Lau | No. 25–429 Border officers need not hold clear and convincing evidence before treating a returning lawful permanent resident as an admission-seeker based on a crime involving moral turpitude. 6–3. Justice Thomas authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan. Second Circuit vacated and remanded. Cisco Systems, Inc. versus Doe | No. 24–856 Courts may not create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute; the Torture Victim Protection Act does not cover aiding-and-abetting liability. 6–3. Justice Barrett authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Jackson concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Kagan. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Exxon Mobil Corp. versus Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) | No. 24–699 The Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs need not separately satisfy FSIA exceptions. 6–3. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded. Landor versus Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety | No. 23–1197 Individual state prison officers may not face personal liability under RLUIPA unless they voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer suits under the statute. 6–3. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan. Fifth Circuit affirmed. Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Pung versus Isabella County, Michigan | No. 25–95 Just compensation following a tax sale equals the auction sale price, not the property's hypothetical fair market value; the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause claim fails. Near-unanimous. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, and by Thomas except as to Part II–B. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Gorsuch and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Gorsuch except as to footnote 1. Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded.

United States v. Hemani | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/02/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026 Overview: A federal law strips gun rights from regular drug users without proof of danger. This case tests how far the Second Amendment's history-and-tradition standard limits Congress's power to disarm marijuana users. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States. For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani. Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to a marijuana user with no history of violence. Posture: District court dismissed the indictment; Fifth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari. Main Arguments: Petitioner (United States): (1) Habitual drunkard laws from the founding era supply a historically analogous tradition for disarming regular drug users; (2) Vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted a similarly dangerous category of people; (3) Section 925(c) offers a constitutional safety valve through individualized relief. Respondent (Hemani): (1) The government's historical analogues fail the why-and-how test since habitual drunkard laws targeted only the incapacitated, not regular users; (2) No genuine circuit split warrants review; (3) Section 925(c)'s recent restoration cannot retroactively cure a violation that predates it. Holding: The government's prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Kagan. Affirmed. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) The government's "habitual drunkard" historical analogues targeted only the incapacitated, not regular or even heavy users, undercutting the claimed "why"; (2) Those laws aimed to protect drunkards and the public from idleness or financial ruin, not categorically violent people, further undercutting the "why"; (3) Historical laws required pre-deprivation process, while Section 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with none, failing the "how." Separate Opinions: Justice Thomas (concurring): Thomas joins the majority fully but argues Section 922(g) likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, since prosecutors need only show a firearm once crossed state lines, inviting a future challenge to the statute's constitutional foundation. Justice Jackson (concurring, joined by Justice Sotomayor): Jackson joins the majority fully but renews her call to replace the Bruen history-and-tradition test with means-end scrutiny, arguing the current framework cannot meaningfully assess whether a law's burden fits the government's stated justification. Justice Alito (concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan): Alito agrees Hemani wins but would rest the decision on narrower ground: the government never proved how much marijuana Hemani used or whether it affected his judgment, unlike incapacitated historical "habitual drunkards." Implications: (1) Federal prosecutors need more than admitted regular drug use to bring a 922(g)(3) charge; (2) Marijuana users in legal-marijuana states gain real protection from automatic federal gun prosecution; (3) Defense attorneys gain a roadmap for similar challenges, while bans on addicts, intoxicated possessors, and felons stay untouched. The Fine Print: Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition." Primary Cases: New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022): Gun laws must match the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, not just serve a strong government interest. United States v. Rahimi (2024): The government need not identify a historical "twin," only a law "relevantly similar" in why and how it operated. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Case Preview [00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins [00:01:08] United States Opening Statement [00:03:09] United States Free for All Questions [00:26:14] United States Round Robin Questions [01:00:32] Hemani Opening Statement [01:02:37] Hemani Free for All Questions [01:31:01] Hemani Round Robin Questions [01:50:46] United States Rebuttal

Hunter v. United States | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/03/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026 Overview: A plea deal's appeal waiver collides with a forced-medication sentence, pushing the Supreme Court to decide when courts can void a waiver — reshaping appellate rights for the ninety-five percent of federal defendants who plead guilty. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter. For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States. Question Presented: Whether an appeal waiver remains enforceable when enforcing it would create a miscarriage of justice in sentencing. Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter's appeal under the waiver; Court granted certiorari to resolve a split. Main Arguments: Petitioner (Hunter): (1) Contract defenses like frustration of purpose render the waiver unenforceable for egregious sentencing errors; (2) the judge's on-record statement granting appeal rights, paired with the prosecutor's silence, voids the waiver; (3) courts must recognize a miscarriage-of-justice exception to prevent egregious, unconstitutional sentencing conditions from escaping all appellate review. Respondent (United States): (1) A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver binds the defendant according to its plain terms; (2) only two narrow exceptions ever excuse a waiver — ineffective assistance and an above-maximum sentence; (3) a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception floods appellate courts and undercuts the value of plea bargaining nationwide. Holding: An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Alito and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) Hunter's claim that the judge's statement and prosecutor's silence voided the waiver fails, since the agreement requires written, signed modifications and the government's chance to enforce the waiver arises only after a notice of appeal; (2) courts retain independent authority over plea waivers, since judges must approve every agreement and appellate courts control enforcement; (3) a miscarriage-of-justice standard, requiring an obvious and egregious error, replaces both the government's absolute-enforcement rule and the Fifth Circuit's narrow two-exception rule. Separate Opinions: Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Traces plea bargaining's coercive growth and catalogues a broader set of miscarriage-of-justice examples, including guideline-calculation errors, while questioning whether prospective appeal waivers can ever satisfy the Constitution's knowing-and-voluntary requirement. Justice Kavanaugh (concurring): Joins the majority in full but writes separately to argue Gorsuch's reading sets a lower bar than the majority opinion actually adopts. Justice Barrett (concurring): Grounds the new rule in "procedural common law" rather than the Court's disputed supervisory power, offering a doctrinal source distinct from the majority's framing. Justice Thomas (dissenting): Dissents alone, arguing the majority cites no genuine source of law for its rule and warns the new standard floods appellate courts with new claims. Implications: (1) Defendants nationwide gain a new, though narrow, path to challenge sentencing errors despite signed appeal waivers; (2) defense attorneys and judges must now weigh whether unusual sentencing conditions risk surviving appellate review; (3) the Fifth Circuit must decide on remand whether Hunter's forced-medication condition clears the new bar. The Fine Print: 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment" Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A): "[T]he court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision" Primary Cases: United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Some baseline of fair procedure survives no matter what a defendant agrees to waive in a plea deal. Santobello v. New York (1971): Plea agreements remain subject to judicial oversight and "sound judicial discretion," not just prosecutorial control. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview [00:01:00] Oral Advocates [00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins [00:01:18] Hunter Opening Statement [00:03:10] Hunter Free for All Questions [00:27:27] Hunter Round Robin Questions [00:45:07] United States Opening Statement [00:46:54] Hunter Free for All Questions [01:15:22] United States Round Robin Questions [01:33:51] Hunter Rebuttal

United States v. Hemani | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/02/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026 Interview with Adeel Bashir: Here Overview: A federal law strips gun rights from regular drug users without proof of danger. This case tests how far the Second Amendment's history-and-tradition standard limits Congress's power to disarm marijuana users. Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to a marijuana user with no history of violence. Posture: District court dismissed the indictment; Fifth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari. Main Arguments: Petitioner (United States): (1) Habitual drunkard laws from the founding era supply a historically analogous tradition for disarming regular drug users; (2) Vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted a similarly dangerous category of people; (3) Section 925(c) offers a constitutional safety valve through individualized relief. Respondent (Hemani): (1) The government's historical analogues fail the why-and-how test since habitual drunkard laws targeted only the incapacitated, not regular users; (2) No genuine circuit split warrants review; (3) Section 925(c)'s recent restoration cannot retroactively cure a violation that predates it. Holding: The government's prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Kagan. Affirmed. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) The government's "habitual drunkard" historical analogues targeted only the incapacitated, not regular or even heavy users, undercutting the claimed "why"; (2) Those laws aimed to protect drunkards and the public from idleness or financial ruin, not categorically violent people, further undercutting the "why"; (3) Historical laws required pre-deprivation process, while Section 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with none, failing the "how." Separate Opinions: Justice Thomas (concurring): Thomas joins the majority fully but argues Section 922(g) likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, since prosecutors need only show a firearm once crossed state lines, inviting a future challenge to the statute's constitutional foundation. Justice Jackson (concurring, joined by Justice Sotomayor): Jackson joins the majority fully but renews her call to replace the Bruen history-and-tradition test with means-end scrutiny, arguing the current framework cannot meaningfully assess whether a law's burden fits the government's stated justification. Justice Alito (concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan): Alito agrees Hemani wins but would rest the decision on narrower ground: the government never proved how much marijuana Hemani used or whether it affected his judgment, unlike incapacitated historical "habitual drunkards." Implications: (1) Federal prosecutors need more than admitted regular drug use to bring a 922(g)(3) charge; (2) Marijuana users in legal-marijuana states gain real protection from automatic federal gun prosecution; (3) Defense attorneys gain a roadmap for similar challenges, while bans on addicts, intoxicated possessors, and felons stay untouched. The Fine Print: Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition." Primary Cases: New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022): Gun laws must match the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, not just serve a strong government interest. United States v. Rahimi (2024): The government need not identify a historical "twin," only a law "relevantly similar" in why and how it operated. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States. For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.

Hunter v. United States | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/03/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026 Overview: A plea deal's appeal waiver collides with a forced-medication sentence, pushing the Supreme Court to decide when courts can void a waiver — reshaping appellate rights for the ninety-five percent of federal defendants who plead guilty. Question Presented: Whether an appeal waiver remains enforceable when enforcing it would create a miscarriage of justice in sentencing. Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter's appeal under the waiver; Court granted certiorari to resolve a split. Main Arguments: Petitioner (Hunter): (1) Contract defenses like frustration of purpose render the waiver unenforceable for egregious sentencing errors; (2) the judge's on-record statement granting appeal rights, paired with the prosecutor's silence, voids the waiver; (3) courts must recognize a miscarriage-of-justice exception to prevent egregious, unconstitutional sentencing conditions from escaping all appellate review. Respondent (United States): (1) A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver binds the defendant according to its plain terms; (2) only two narrow exceptions ever excuse a waiver — ineffective assistance and an above-maximum sentence; (3) a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception floods appellate courts and undercuts the value of plea bargaining nationwide. Holding: An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Alito and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) Hunter's claim that the judge's statement and prosecutor's silence voided the waiver fails, since the agreement requires written, signed modifications and the government's chance to enforce the waiver arises only after a notice of appeal; (2) courts retain independent authority over plea waivers, since judges must approve every agreement and appellate courts control enforcement; (3) a miscarriage-of-justice standard, requiring an obvious and egregious error, replaces both the government's absolute-enforcement rule and the Fifth Circuit's narrow two-exception rule. Separate Opinions: Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Traces plea bargaining's coercive growth and catalogues a broader set of miscarriage-of-justice examples, including guideline-calculation errors, while questioning whether prospective appeal waivers can ever satisfy the Constitution's knowing-and-voluntary requirement. Justice Kavanaugh (concurring): Joins the majority in full but writes separately to argue Gorsuch's reading sets a lower bar than the majority opinion actually adopts. Justice Barrett (concurring): Grounds the new rule in "procedural common law" rather than the Court's disputed supervisory power, offering a doctrinal source distinct from the majority's framing. Justice Thomas (dissenting): Dissents alone, arguing the majority cites no genuine source of law for its rule and warns the new standard floods appellate courts with new claims. Implications: (1) Defendants nationwide gain a new, though narrow, path to challenge sentencing errors despite signed appeal waivers; (2) defense attorneys and judges must now weigh whether unusual sentencing conditions risk surviving appellate review; (3) the Fifth Circuit must decide on remand whether Hunter's forced-medication condition clears the new bar. The Fine Print: 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment" Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A): "[T]he court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision" Primary Cases: United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Some baseline of fair procedure survives no matter what a defendant agrees to waive in a plea deal. Santobello v. New York (1971): Plea agreements remain subject to judicial oversight and "sound judicial discretion," not just prosecutorial control. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter. For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 18, 2026 Overview: A Maryland woman signed a state-court consent order to secure release from involuntary psychiatric commitment, then challenged that order in federal district court while her state-court appeal remained pending — pushing the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits challenging state-court judgments that remain subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed District Court's dismissal of T.M.'s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of jurisdiction. Main Arguments: T.M. (Petitioner): (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil's confinement to the procedural circumstances of Rooker and Feldman; (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending the doctrine to non-final state-court judgments; (3) preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without imposing a blunt jurisdictional bar. UMD Medical System (Respondent): (1) Exxon Mobil's four-element test contains no finality requirement; district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to void state-court judgments regardless of pending state review; (2) T.M. satisfies every Rooker-Feldman element — she asked a federal court to declare void a consent order entered ten days before she filed; (3) T.M.'s rule spawns parallel duplicative litigation, gamesmanship, and federalism harm that abstention and preclusion fail to prevent. Holding: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking federal review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Affirmed. Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. Fourth Circuit affirmed. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) T.M.'s finality theory contradicts precedent — Rooker (1923), Feldman (1983), and Exxon Mobil (2005) all rest on a functional distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction, not on section 1257's finality requirement; (2) T.M.'s rule produces arbitrary results and invites gamesmanship — identical plaintiffs with different filing timing reach opposite outcomes; (3) abstention and preclusion doctrines don't substitute where a plaintiff directly attacks a state-court judgment as the source of injury. Separate Opinions: Justice Thomas concurred in full, writing separately to ground Rooker in constitutional text and Founding history — the power to revise another court's judgment always constituted appellate jurisdiction, and Congress never granted district courts that revising power over state civil judgments. Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. The dissent argued Exxon Mobil confined the doctrine to cases filed "after the state proceedings ended," and the majority expanded a doctrinally shaky rule beyond Exxon's mandate. Implications: (1) State-court losers cannot access federal district court while state appeals remain open — they must exhaust state remedies first; (2) The core Rooker-Feldman ambiguity — distinguishing judgment attacks from independent federal claims — survives and drives future litigation; (3) T.M. retains a stayed Maryland state appeal and may yet petition the Supreme Court if constitutional questions survive. The Fine Print: 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..." 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Primary Cases: Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman doctrine "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claimed as support. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments — such relief constitutes an exercise of appellate jurisdiction that Congress vested exclusively in the Supreme Court. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Argument Preview [00:01:15] Oral Advocates [00:01:27] Argument Begins [00:01:35] T.M. Opening Statement [00:03:51] T.M. Free for All Questions [00:27:56] T.M. Round Robin Questions [00:42:13] UMD Medical Opening Statement [00:44:01] UMD Medical Free for All Questions [00:59:41] UMD Medical Round Robin Questions [00:59:50] T.M. Rebuttal

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 18, 2026 Overview: A Maryland woman signed a state-court consent order to secure release from involuntary psychiatric commitment, then challenged that order in federal district court while her state-court appeal remained pending — pushing the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits challenging state-court judgments that remain subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed District Court's dismissal of T.M.'s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of jurisdiction. Main Arguments: T.M. (Petitioner): (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil's confinement to the procedural circumstances of Rooker and Feldman; (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending the doctrine to non-final state-court judgments; (3) preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without imposing a blunt jurisdictional bar. UMD Medical System (Respondent): (1) Exxon Mobil's four-element test contains no finality requirement; district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to void state-court judgments regardless of pending state review; (2) T.M. satisfies every Rooker-Feldman element — she asked a federal court to declare void a consent order entered ten days before she filed; (3) T.M.'s rule spawns parallel duplicative litigation, gamesmanship, and federalism harm that abstention and preclusion fail to prevent. Holding: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking federal review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Affirmed. Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. Fourth Circuit affirmed. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) T.M.'s finality theory contradicts precedent — Rooker (1923), Feldman (1983), and Exxon Mobil (2005) all rest on a functional distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction, not on section 1257's finality requirement; (2) T.M.'s rule produces arbitrary results and invites gamesmanship — identical plaintiffs with different filing timing reach opposite outcomes; (3) abstention and preclusion doctrines don't substitute where a plaintiff directly attacks a state-court judgment as the source of injury. Separate Opinions: Justice Thomas concurred in full, writing separately to ground Rooker in constitutional text and Founding history — the power to revise another court's judgment always constituted appellate jurisdiction, and Congress never granted district courts that revising power over state civil judgments. Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. The dissent argued Exxon Mobil confined the doctrine to cases filed "after the state proceedings ended," and the majority expanded a doctrinally shaky rule beyond Exxon's mandate. Implications: (1) State-court losers cannot access federal district court while state appeals remain open — they must exhaust state remedies first; (2) The core Rooker-Feldman ambiguity — distinguishing judgment attacks from independent federal claims — survives and drives future litigation; (3) T.M. retains a stayed Maryland state appeal and may yet petition the Supreme Court if constitutional questions survive. The Fine Print: 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..." 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Primary Cases: Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman doctrine "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claimed as support. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments — such relief constitutes an exercise of appellate jurisdiction that Congress vested exclusively in the Supreme Court. Oral Advocates: Petitioner (T.M.): Elizabeth B. Prelogar of Cooley LLP Respondents (University of Maryland Medical System Corporation): Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026 Overview: The Investment Company Act case addresses whether Section 47(b) grants private parties the right to sue for contract rescission, testing the limits of implied private rights of ac Oral Advocates: Petitioner (Abouammo): Tobias Loss-Eaton of Sidley Austin Respondent (United States): Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice. Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission. Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed. Main Arguments: Petitioner (the Funds): (1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval ; (2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement; (3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right. Respondent (Saba): (1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties; (2) TAMA 's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right; (3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA. Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Kagan joining Parts I and II. Reversed and remanded. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval ; (2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement; (3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right. Separate Opinions: Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports. Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA 's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA. Implications: (1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer; (2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation; (3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval 's framework further into securities law. The Fine Print: Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter." Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock." Primary Cases: Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Argument Preview [00:01:12] Argument Begins [00:01:21] Abouammo Opening Statement [00:03:30] Abouammo Free for All Questions [00:26:27] Abouammo Round Robin Questions [00:33:40] United States Opening Statement [00:35:54] United States Free for All Questions [01:04:34] United States Round Robin Questions [01:13:58] Abouammo Rebuttal

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026 Overview: The Investment Company Act case addresses whether Section 47(b) grants private parties the right to sue for contract rescission, testing the limits of implied private rights of action against a comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner (FS Credit) and Respondents (BlackRock): Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C. For United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of FS Credit and BlackRock: Max E. Schulman, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice For Respondent (Saba): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, VA Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission. Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed. Main Arguments: Petitioner (the Funds): (1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval ; (2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement; (3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right. Respondent (Saba): (1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties; (2) TAMA 's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right; (3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA. Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Kagan joining Parts I and II. Reversed and remanded. Opinion: Here Majority Reasoning: (1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval ; (2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement; (3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right. Separate Opinions: Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports. Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA 's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA. Implications: (1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer; (2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation; (3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval 's framework further into securities law. The Fine Print: Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter." Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock." Primary Cases: Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview [00:01:23] Oral Argument Begins [00:01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement [00:03:40] Petitioner Free for All Questions [00:19:29] Petitioner Round Robin Questions [00:30:53] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement [00:32:17] United States Free for All Questions [00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions [00:46:27] Respondent Opening Statement [00:48:55] Respondent Free for All Questions [01:16:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions [01:16:58] Petitioner Rebuttal